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                                                         Abstract 
A solution for computer database content rights protection through watermarking. Rights 
protection for relative information is of ever-increasing interest, particularly considering areas 
wherever sensitive, valuable content is to be outsourced. A decent example could be a data 
processing application, wherever, information is sold in items to parties specialized in mining it. 
Totally different avenues are on the market, every with its own benefits and disadvantages. 
Social control by legal suggests that is sometimes ineffective in preventing thievery of 
proprietary works, unless increased by a digital counterpart, for instance, watermarking. 
Whereas, having the ability to handle higher level linguistics constraints, like classification 
preservation, our resolution additionally addresses necessary attacks, like set choice and 
random and linear information changes. We introduce wmdb.*, a proof-of-concept 
implementation and its application to real-life information, namely, in watermarking the 
outsourced Wal-Mart sales information that we have on the market at our institute. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The main purpose of Digital Watermarking is to 
shield a definite content from unauthorized 
duplication and distribution by facultative 
demonstrable possession over the content. It is 
historically relied upon the provision of an 
oversized noise domain at intervals that the item 
may be altered whereas holding its essential 
properties. As an example, the smallest amount 
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vital bits of image pixels may be haphazardly 
altered with very little impact on the visual quality 
of the image (as perceived by a human). In fact, 
abundant of the ―bandwidth‖ for inserting 
watermarks (such as within the least vital bits) is 
owing to the shortcoming of human sensory system 
(especially sight and hearing) to observe bound 
changes. A lot of recently, the main target of 
watermarking for digital rights protection is shifting 
toward totally different knowledge sorts like text, 
software, and algorithms. Since these knowledge 
sorts have terribly well-defined linguistics (as 
compared to those of pictures, video, or music) and 
will be designed for machine consumption, the 
identification of the out there ―bandwidth‖ for 
watermarking is as vital a challenge because the 
algorithms for inserting the watermarks themselves. 
A challenge of watermarking is to insert an 
indelible mark in the object such that 1) the 
insertion of the mark does not destroy the value of 
the object (i.e., the object is still useful for the 
intended purpose) and 2) it is difficult for an 
adversary to remove or alter the mark beyond 
detection without destroying the value of the object. 
Clearly, the notion of value or utility of the object is 
central to the watermarking process. This is closely 
related to the type of data and its intended use. For 
example, in the case of software, the value may be 
in ensuring equivalent computation and, for text, it 
may be in conveying the same meaning (i.e., 
synonym substitution is acceptable). Similarly, for a 
collection of numbers, the utility of the data malie 
in the actual or the relative values of the numbers, 
or in the distribution (e.g., normal with a certain 
mean).  
 
Although, a substantial quantity of try has been 
endowed within the downside of watermarking 
multimedia system information (images, video, and 
audio), there is comparatively very little work on 
watermarking different varieties of information [1, 
2]. Recent work has addressed the issues of 
software system watermarking and tongue 
watermarking. Here, we tend to study the problem 
of watermarking numeric relative content. 
Protective rights over outsourced relative 
information are of ever-increasing interest, 
particularly considering areas wherever sensitive, 
valuable information is to be outsourced. Sensible 
examples are data processing applications (e.g., 
Wal-Mart sales information, oil drilling 
information, monetary information, etc.), wherever, 
a group of information is sometimes 
produced/collected by an information collector then 
sold-out in items to parties specialised in mining 
that data. Given the character of most of the 
information, it is onerous to associate rights of the 
creator over it. Watermarking will be accustomed 
solve this issue [3]. 
 
An important point about watermarking should be 
An important point about watermarking should be 
noted. By its very nature, a watermark modifies the 
item being watermarked. If the object to be 
watermarked cannot be modified, then a watermark 
cannot be inserted. The critical issue is not to avoid 
changing the data, but to limit the change to 
acceptable levels with respect to the intended use of 
the data. Clearly, one can always identify some use 
of the data that would be affected by even a minor 
change to any portion of it. It is, therefore, 
necessary that the intended purpose of the data to be 
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preserved is identified during the watermarking 
process. Whereas, extensive research has focused 
on various aspects of DBMS security, including 
access control techniques as well as data security 
issues, little has been done to secure proof of rights 
over relational data. Only one related 
simultaneously published effort is available for 
comparison numerous fundamental differences 
distinguish our results from this effort [4, 5].
In this paper, we explore the issue of securing 
valuable outsourced data through watermarking, 
enabling court proofs assessing proper rights over 
the content. Thus, the main contributions of the 
present work include: 
 
1. A resilient watermarking method for 
relational data,   
2. A technique for enabling user-level runtime 
control over properties that are to be 
preserved as well as the degree of change 
introduced,   
3. a complete, user-friendly implementation for 
numeric relational data, and   
4. The deployment of the implementation on 
real data, in watermarking the Wal-Mart 
Sales Database and the analysis thereof.  
 
Our solution starts by receiving as user input a 
reference to the relational data to be rights-
protected, a watermark to be embedded as a 
copyright proof, a secret key used to protect the 
embedding, and a set of data quality constraints be 
preserved in the result. It then proceeds to 
watermark the data while continuously assessing 
data quality, potentially backtracking, and rolling 
back undesirable alterations that do not preserdat 
quality. Watermark embedding is composed of two 
main parts: In the first stage, the input data set is 
securely partitioned into subsets of items; the 
second stage then encodes one bit of the watermark 
into each subset. If more subsets (than watermark 
bits) are available, error correction is deployed to 
result in an increasingly resilient embedding. The 
algorithms introduced here prove to be resilient 
important classes of attacks, including subset 
selection, linear data changes, and random 
alterations.  
 
CHALLENGES 
 
While analysis associated with the difficulty of 
embedding info into a group of numbers associate 
degree be found (sometimes implicitly) in several 
frameworks, related to varied info concealment 
techniques (e.g., frequency domain embedding, 
DCT, and ripple watermarking), relational 
information presents a special set of challenges and 
associated constraints [6]. These challenges area 
unit novel and directly associated with the specifics 
of the domain, namely, massive sets of things 
organized in a very relative framework, with 
associated linguistics to be preserved. This can be 
not the case for transmission (mostly time-series 
kind of) information, wherever, linguistics area unit 
related to the info stream solely at a way higher 
composite level. As an example, in a very multi-
megabit audio channel of stories broadcast, the 
linguistics to be protected area unit seemingly to be 
within the broadcast speech text instead of directly 
within the underlying audio stream bits; so, a 
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basically totally different and broader noise band 
becomes accessible for watermark embedding, and 
with it totally different (possibly less accurate) 
cryptography and analysis ways. In contrast, the 
low noise information measure of major relative 
framework information uses (e.g., information 
mining) need a special approach, taking a lot of 
careful consider the particular tolerated changes on 
the given information [7].  
 
Whereas, within the multimedia system case, the 
info quality model is sometimes at the best fuzzy as 
a result of the Einstein's theory of relativity of any 
model of human perception, one resolution here is 
to outline the noise channel expressly as a part of 
the watermarking resolution, in terms of needed 
client constraints to be preserved on the ultimate 
information. At watermarking time, information 
quality is often unceasingly assessed as AN 
intrinsic a part of the marking algorithmic program 
in itself. During this respect, we are able to claim 
that, as against different watermarking algorithms 
in varied domains (e.g., image watermarking), we 
have a tendency to maintain 100% of the associated 
information price with relation to a collection of 
given needed information ―goodness‖ constraints. 
We believe this is an essential part of any 
watermarking application in this low-noise, high-
fragility domain of relational data, especially 
considering data mining issues, such as 
classification and JOIN results preservation. 
 
 
Additionally, the watermark coding methodology 
has to feature a style suited to the new constraints, 
namely, the flexibility to survive a most level of 
attacks and, at a similar time, accommodate the 
existence of needed knowledge ―usability‖ 
conditions to be glad by the result. Our algorithmic 
program, deploying means that for knowledge 
distribution manipulation and coding the particular 
data in distribution properties of the information 
instead of directly into the information itself, is best 
fitted to its purpose, and nearly optimally therefore. 
For, whereas permitting Associate in Nursing 
adjustable degree of freedom in alteration points 
choice, it provides at a similar time a astonishingly 
high level of resilience as proved by our in depth 
validation experiments. 
 
Available Bandwidth  
 
An important first step in inserting a watermark into 
a relational database (and thereby altering it), is to 
identify changes that are acceptable. As was 
mentioned earlier, the acceptable nature and level 
of change is dependent upon the application for 
which the data is to be used. With respect to 
particular data uses and metrics of quality, it is of 
utmost importance that the watermarking process 
not interferes with the final data consumer 
requirements. This is why these requirements need 
to be considered as an integral part of the 
watermarking process, providing a feedback loop, 
in assessing the quality of the final result. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, our solution is the 
first to recognize the importance of these essential 
desiderata and provide a direct algorithm for it. In 
the following, we define a functionality that will 
enable us to determine the watermarking result as 
being valuable and valid, within 
permitted/guaranteed error bounds. The available 
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―bandwidth‖ for inserting the bits of the watermark 
text is, therefore, not defined directly. Instead, we 
define allowable distortion bounds for the input 
data in terms of consumer-defined metrics. If the 
water-marked data satisfies the metrics, then the 
insertion of watermark is considered to be 
successful. This quality assessment mechanism is 
part of the marking process. 
 
Example: One simple but relevant example is the 
maximum allowable mean squared error case, in 
which the usability metrics are defined in terms 
of mean squared error tolerances as 
 
ðsi _ viÞ
2
 < ti   8i ¼ 1; . . . ; n  
and 
P
ðsi _ viÞ
2
 < tmax, where S ¼ fs1; :::; sng _ IR 
is the data to be watermarked, V ¼ fv1; . . . ; vng 
is the result, T ¼ ft1; . . . ; tng _ IR, and tmax 2 IR 
define the guaran-teed error bounds at data 
distribution time. In other words, T defines the 
allowable distortions for individual elements in 
terms of mean squared error (MSE) and tmax the 
overall permissible MS 
 
Database Semantics 
Specifying solely allowable modification limits on 
individual values associate degreed presumably an 
overall limit, fails to capture necessary linguistics 
options related to knowledge-especially if the data 
is structured. Consider, as an example, age data. 
Whereas, a little modification to the age values 
could also be acceptable, it should be vital that 
people that are younger than twenty one stay thus 
even when watermarking if the information are 
would not to verify behavior patterns for under-age 
drinking. Similarly, if an equivalent knowledge 
were to be used for distinguishing legal voters, the 
cut-off would be eighteen years. Moreover, for a 
few different application, it should be necessary 
that the relative ages (in terms of that one is 
younger) not modification. Different samples of 
constraints embody: 
1. Uniqueness-each value must be unique;   
2. Scale-the ratio between any two number 
before and after the change must remain the 
same; and   
3. Classification-the objects must remain in the 
same class (defined by a range of values) 
before and after the watermarking.  
 
As is clear from the above examples, simple bounds 
on the change of numerical values are often not 
enough. 
 
Structured Data 
Structured collections, for example, a collection of 
relations, present further constraints that must be 
adhered to by the watermarking algorithm. 
Consider a data warehouse organized using a 
standard Star schema with a fact table and several 
dimension tables. It is important that the key 
relationships be preserved by the watermarking 
algorithm. This is similar to the ―Cascade on 
update‖ option for foreign keys in SQL and ensures 
that tuples that join before watermarking also join 
after water-marking. This requires that the new 
value for any attribute should be unique after the 
watermarking process. In other words, we want to 
preserve the relationship between the various tables. 
More generally, the relationship could be expressed 
in terms of an arbitrary join condition, not just a 
natural join. In addition to relationships between 
tuples, relational data may have constraints within 
tuples. For example, if a relation contains the start 
Journal of Data Mining and Management 
Volume 1 Issue 3 
 
 
 
6            Page 1-15 © MAT Journals 2016. All Rights Reserved 
 
and end times of a Web interaction, it is important 
that each tuple satisfies the condition that the end 
time be later than the start time. 
 
Also, an adversary attempting to destroy a 
watermark becomes much more effective if he can 
identify the values in which the watermark has been 
embedded. In addition to specifying properties of 
the data that should be preserved for usability, 
constraints can be used to prevent easy detection of 
watermark locations. For example, a tuple with a 
start time later than its corresponding end time, or a 
customer with an age less than 12 years is very 
likely to be detected as resulting from 
watermarking. 
 
 
Model of the Adversary  
 
In order to be effective, the watermarking technique 
must be able to survive a wide variety of attacks. 
These attacks may be malicious with the explicit 
intent of removing the watermark, or may be the 
result of normal use of the data by the intended 
user. 
 
Subset Selection 
The attacker (Mallory) can randomly select and use 
a subset of the original data set that might still 
provide value for its intended purpose (subtractive 
attack). 
 
Subset Addition 
Mallory adds a set of numbers to the original set. 
This addition is not to significantly alter the useful 
(from the Mallory’s perspective) properties of the 
initial set versus the resulting set. 
 
Subset Alteration 
Altering a subset of the items in the original data set 
such that there is still value associated with the 
resulting set. A special case needs to be outlined 
here, namely, (A3.a) a linear transformation 
performed uniformly to all of the items. This is of 
particular interest as such a transformation 
preserves many data mining related properties of 
the data, while actually altering it considerably, 
making it necessary to provide resilience against it. 
Given the attacks above, several properties of a 
successful solution surface. For immunity against 
A1, the water-mark has to be embedded in overall 
collection properties that survive subset selection 
(e.g., confidence intervals). If the assumption is 
made that the attack alterations do not destroy the 
value of the data, then A3 should be defeatable by 
embedding the primitive mark in resilient global 
data properties. As a special case, A3.a can be 
defeated by a preliminary normalization step in 
which a common divider to all the items is first 
identified and applied. For a given item X, for 
notation purposes, we are going to denote this 
―normalized‖ version of it by NORMðXÞ. Since it 
adds new data to the set, defeating A2 seems to be 
the most difficult task, as it implies the ability to 
identify potential uses of the data (for Mallory). 
 
Subset Recovery 
Another interesting requirement is the ability to 
―recognize‖ all (or at least most) of the collection 
items before and after watermarking and/or an 
attack. That is, how do we ―recognize‖ an item and 
its corresponding subset after it has been changed 
slightly? 
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SIMPLIFIED PROBLEM: NUMERIC    
COLLECTIONS 
 
This section deals with the foundations of a 
primitive numeric collection watermarking 
procedure that will be later deployed as a 
subroutine in the main watermarking algorithm. S 
be a set of n real numbers S ¼ fs1; . . . ; sng _ IR. 
Then, the general simplified problem of 
watermarking the set S can be defined as the 
problem of finding a transforma-tion from S to 
another item set V, such that, given all imposed 
usability metrics sets G ¼ [Gi for any and all 
subsets Si _ S, that hold for S, then, after the 
transformation yields V, the metrics should hold 
also for V.
1
 we call V the ―water-marked‖ version 
of S. Thus, V ¼ fv1; . . . ; vng _ IR is the result of 
watermarking S by minor alterations to its content. 
Let a string of bits w of size m << n is the desired 
watermark to be embedded into the data (jwj ¼ m). 
We will use the notation wi to denote the ith bit of 
w. 
 
But, how much of a change is to be allowed to the 
content? For a numeric collection, a natural starting 
point for defining the allowed change is to specify 
an absolute (or relative) change in value. For 
example, each value may be altered by no more 
than 0.0005 or 0.02 percent. Moreover, a bound on 
the cummulative change may be specified. Our 
solution for the simplified problem consists of 
several steps. First, we deploy a resilient method for 
item labeling, enabling the required ability to 
―recognize‖ initial items at watermarking detection 
time (i.e., after watermarking and/ or attacks). In 
the next step, we ensure attack survivability by 
―amplifying‖ the power of a given primitive water-
marking method. The amplification effect is 
achieved by deploying secrets in the process of 
selecting the subsets to become input for the final 
stage, in which a primitive encoding method is 
deployed. Before watermarking, e.g., being 
identified with a certain label L, then, hopefully, at 
watermark detection time the same item is 
identified with the same label L or a known 
mapping to the new label. More generally, we 
would like to be able to identify a majority of the 
initial elements of a subset after watermarking 
and/or attacks. As we will see, our technique is 
resilient to ―missing‖ a small number of items.   
 
Our solution relies on lexicographically sorting the 
things within the assortment, sorting occurring 
supported a unidirectional, in secret keyed, 
cryptographical hash of the set of most important 
bits (MSB) of the normalized version of the things. 
The key unidirectional hashing ensures that Mallory 
cannot probably confirm the ordering. Within the 
next step, set ―chunks‖ of the things area unit elite 
supported this secret ordering. Chunk-boundaries 
(―subset markers‖) area unit then computed and 
hold on for detection time More formally, given a 
collection of items as above, S ¼ fs1; . . . ; sng _ IR, 
and a secret ―sorting key‖ ks, we induce a secret 
ordering on it by sorting according to a 
cryptographic keyed hash of the most significant 
bits of the normalized items. Thus, we have: 
 
indexðsiÞ¼ Hðks; MSBðNORMðsiÞÞ; ksÞ: 
 
The MSB space here is assumed to be a domain 
where minor changes on the collection items 
(changes that still satisfy the given required 
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usability metrics) have a minimal impact on the 
MSB labels. This is true in many cases (as usually 
the usability metrics are related to preserving the 
―important‖ parts of the original data). If not 
suitable, a different labeling space can be 
envisioned, one where, as above, minor changes on 
the collection items has a minimal impact. 
 
Note: In the relational data framework, the 
existence of a primary key associated with the 
given attribute to be watermarked can make it 
easier to impose a secret sorting 
 
Solution Summary  
 
A summary of the solution for the simplified 
problem reads as follows:  
 
Encoding Phase: (E.1) 
Select a maximal number of unique, nonintersecting 
(see below) subsets of the original set, using a set of 
secrets, as described in Section 3.3. (E.2) For each 
considered subset, (E.2.1) embed a watermark bit 
into it using the encoding convention in Section 3.3 
and (E.2.2) check for data usability bounds. If 
usability bounds are exceeded, (E.2.3) retry 
different encoding parameter variations or, if still 
no success, (E.2.3a) try to mark the subset as 
invalid (i.e., see encoding convention in Section 
3.3), or if still no success, (E.2.4) ignore the current 
set.
2
 We repeat step E.2 until no more subsets are 
available for encoding. This results in multiple 
embeddings in the data. 
 
Decoding Phase: (D.1) 
Using the secrets from step E.1, recover a majority 
of the subsets considered in E.1, (or all if no attacks 
were performed on the data). (D.2) For each 
considered subset, using the encoding convention in 
Section 3.3, recover the embedded bit value and 
reconstruct watermarks. (D.3) The result of D.2 is a 
set of copies of the same watermark with various 
potential errors. This last step uses a set of error 
correcting mechanisms (e.g., majority voting 
schemes) to recover the highest likelihood initial 
mark. 
 
Selecting Subsets  
 
Watermarking a collection of data items requiresth 
ability to ―recognize‖ (i.e., rediscover, at detection 
time) most of the items before and after 
watermarking and/or a security attack. In other 
words, if an item was accessed/modified 
 
1. In other words, if G is given and holds for 
the initial input data, S, then G should also hold for 
the resulting data V.   
2. This leaves an invalid watermark bit 
encoded in the data that will be corrected by the 
deployed error correcting mechanisms (e.g., 
majority voting) at extraction time.  
Amplifying Watermark Power  
 
Current watermarking algorithms draw most of 
their court-persuasion power from a secret that 
controlled water-mark embedding (i.e., 
watermarking key). Much of the attack immunity 
associated with a watermarking algorithm is based 
on this key and its level of secrecy. Given a weak 
partial marking technique (e.g., (re)setting a bit), a 
strong marking method can be derived by a method 
of ―mark amplification‖—repeatedly applying the 
weak technique in a keyed fashion on different 
parts of the data being watermarked. 
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Generic Solution 
Let K ¼ fk1; . . . ; kmg be a set of m keys of n bits 
each. We define 
 
Si ¼ fsj 2 SjðkiÞbitj ¼ 1g; i ¼ 1; . . . ; m:  
In other words, each Si _ S is defined by selecting a 
subset of S fully determined by its corresponding 
key ki 2 K.  
    
In most scenarios, watermarking outsourced 
relational content happens only once, at outsourcing 
time. The main purpose of watermarking in this 
framework is rights-protection and/or traitor tracing 
through fingerprinting. Thus, there seems to be little 
to be gained from an ability to watermark at 
runtime, in the presence of updates. More-over, 
because watermarking inherently alters the data, it 
is unreasonable to assume that a certain party would 
keep an altered (i.e., watermarked) copy of the data 
as replacement for the original. 
 
Nevertheless, our solution naturally supports on-
the-fly watermarking, especially in the presence of 
updates. Let us analyze several different update 
scenarios: 
 
1. Updates that add fresh tuples to the already 
water-marked data set,   
2. Updates that remove tuples from the already 
ter-marked data, and   
3. Updates that alter existing tuples.  
 
In each of the cases, we assume that the 
watermarking mechanism runs continuously as a 
dormant process and is notified for each update, 
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Fig. 1: Watermark Detection Algorithm (version using Subset Markers and Detection Maps Shown
 
HðK
0
; keyÞÞ mod e ¼ 0) is performed on a MSB 
portion of the primary key K, i.e., K
0
 ¼ MSBðKÞ. 
This is to be subject to further investigation, 
hopefully resulting in primary key independence. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
This section presents our implementation and the 
experimental results of watermarking real-life, 
commercial, data, namely, the Wal-Mart Sales 
relational database. 
 
 
Implementation: wmdb.*  
 
wmdb.* is our test-bed implementation of the 
algorithms presented in this paper. It is written 
using the Java language and uses the JDBC API in 
accessing the data. The package receives as input a 
watermark to be embedded, a secret key to be used 
for embedding, a set of relations/attributes to 
consider in watermarking as well as a set of 
external usability  
 
plugin modules. The role of the plugin modules is 
to allow user-defined query metrics to be deployed 
and queried at runtime without recompilation 
and/or software restart.
 
Once usability metrics are 
defined and all other parameters are in place, the 
watermarking module initiates the process of 
watermarking. An undo/rollback log is kept for 
each atomic step performed (i.e., 1-bit encoding) 
until data usability is assessed and confirmed (by 
querying the currently active usability plugins). 
This allows for rollbacks in the case when data 
quality is not preserved by the current atomic 
operation. Watermark recovery takes as input the 
watermarking key used in embedding, the set of 
attributes known to contain the watermark as well 
as various other encoding specific parameters. 
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Fig. 2: Resilience to Data Surgeries: (a) Uniform 
Distribution, (b) Normal Distribution, and (c) 
Single Subset (1-bit) Encoding. 
 
Our experimental setup included access to the 4 
TBytes Wal-mart data, (formerly) hosted on a NCR 
Teradata machine, one 1.8GHz CPU Linux box 
with Sun JDK 1.4 and 384MB RAM. The amount 
of data available is enormous. For example, the 
ItemScan relation contains more than 840 million 
tuples. For testing purposes, we deployed our 
algorithm on a randomly selected subset of the 
original data (e.g., just a maximum of 141,075 
tuples for relation UnivClassTables.Store Visits).  
 
We assessed computation times and observed an 
intuitively (according to the O(n) nature of the 
algorithm) linear behavior, directly proportional 
with the input data size. Given the setup described 
above, in single-user mode, with a local database 
we obtained an average of around 350-400 
tuples/second for watermark embedding, while 
detection turned out to be approximatively twice as 
fast. This occurs in the nonoptimized, interpreted  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Java proof-of-concept implementation. 
We expect major   speedups (orders of magnitude) 
in a real-life deployment version. In the following, 
we present experiments involving attacks (data loss, 
data alterations, linear changes, data resorting) as 
well as the evaluation of the available bandwidth in 
the presence of different data goodness metrics 
(tolerable absolute change and data classification 
preservation). 
 
Data Loss Attacks (“Surgeries”) 
 
In this attack scenario, we study the distortion of 
the watermark as the input data is subjected to 
gradually increasing levels of data loss. In Figure 
2c, the analysis is performed repeatedly for single 
bit encoding using the ―confidence-violators‖ 
encoding method outlined. The results are then 
averaged over multiple runs. The ―confidence-
violators‖ primitive set encoding proves to be 
resilient to a consider-able amount of randomly 
occurring uniformly distributed surgeries (i.e., item 
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removals by Mallory, with no extra knowledge) 
before watermark alterations occur. Even then, there 
exists the ability to ―trace‖ or approximate the 
original watermark to a certain degree (i.e., by 
trying to infer the original mark value from an 
invalid set). The set size considered was 35, 
experiments were performed on 30 different sets of 
close to normally distributed data. Other parameters 
for the experiment include: 
 
vfalse ¼ 5%; vtrue ¼ 9%; c ¼ 88%: 
 
The average behavior is plotted in the graphs. Up to 
25 percent and above data loss was tolerated easily 
by the tested data, before mark alteration (i.e., bit-
flip) occurred.  
 
Figures 2a and b depict more complex scenarios in 
which a real multibit watermark is embedded into a 
larger data set (both (a) uniform and (b) normal 
distributions in Figure 2 were considered). The 
input data contained 8,000 tuples, subset size was 
30, and the considered watermark was 12 bits long. 
Other parameters: vfalse ¼ 35%; c ¼ 85%. 
This set is then subjected to various degrees of data 
loss and the watermark distortion is observed. The 
encoding method again proves to be surprisingly 
resilient by allowing up to 45-50 percent data loss 
while still 40-45 percent of the watermark survives. 
Also, in Figure 2a, as data alteration increases, the 
subset (i.e., secretly selected for encoding 1-bit) 
overlap (i.e., the ―resemblance‖ to the original 
content, the number of same elements in resulting 
subsets) degrades. 
 
Note on Data Dependency in Figures. Some of the 
figures presented in this section feature ―spikes.‖ 
This is a result of the adaptive data-dependent 
nature of the encoding. Different input data reacts 
differently to data surgeries (for example) and 
feature slightly varying behavior at distinct points. 
Averaging over multiple inputs provides a solution 
for this issue. Nevertheless, we believe that, while it 
might soften the spikes, it would also (arguably) 
tone down distinct features for a given data set, 
features that interrelate figures. Instead of focusing 
on local variations, the figures should be interpreted 
as an illustrative sample of the global governing 
trends. 
 
Data Alteration Attacks (Epsilon-Attack) 
 
Presented with the watermarked data Mallory is 
faced with two contradictory tasks: preserving the 
inherent value of the data while, at the same time, 
removing the hidden water-mark. Given no 
knowledge of the secret watermarking key nor of 
the original data, the only available choice is to 
attempt (minor) random data modifications in the 
hope that, at some point, the watermark will be 
destroyed. Because the original data is unknown 
(thus, also the current watermark-related distortion 
is unknown), it is impossible for Mallory to 
determine the real ―minority‖ of changes he/she 
performs. 
In other words, because of the goal of preserving 
the data value, Mallory cannot afford to perform 
significant change to the data. 
 
In this experiment, we analyze the sensitivity of our 
watermarking scheme to randomly occurring 
changes, as a direct measure for watermark 
resilience. To do this, we define a transformation 
that modifies a percentage _ of the input data within 
certain bounds defined by two variables _ and _. 
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We called this transformation epsilon-attack. 
Epsilon-attacks can model any uninformed, random 
alteration—the only available attack alternative. A 
normal epsilon-attack modifies roughly 
_
2 percent of 
the input tuples by multiplication with ð1 þ _ þ _Þ 
and the other 
_
2 percent by multiplication with ð1 þ 
_ _ _Þ. A uniform altering epsilon-attack modifies _ 
percent of the input tuples by multi-plication with a 
uniformly distributed value in the ð1 þ _ _ _; 1 þ _ þ 
_Þ interval. 
 
A comparison is made between the case of 
uniformly distributed (i.e., values are altered 
randomly between 100 and 120 percent of their 
original value) and fixed alterations (i.e., values are 
increased by exactly 20 percent). In the case of 
fixed alterations, the behavior demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the encoding convention: As more 
and more of the tuples are altered linearly, the data 
distribution comes increasingly closer to the 
original shape. For example, when 100 percent of 
the data is modified consistently and linearly, the 
mark data suffers only 6 percent alterations. A peak 
around 50 percent data alterations can be observed 
indicating that an attack changing roughly 50 
percent of the data might have a greater chance of  
success. This is also intuitively so (in the case of 
randomly distributed alterations) as a maximal 
change in distribution is expected naturally when 
close to half of the data set is skewed in the same 
―direction‖ (by addition or subtraction). 
 
Parameter_models the average of the data alteration 
distribution while _ controls its width. Naturally, a 
zero-average epsilon-attack (_ ¼ 0) is a 
transformation that modifies roughly 
_
2 percent of 
the input tuples by multi-plication with ð1 þ _Þ and 
the other 
_
2 percent by multi-plication with ð1 _ _Þ. 
 
The behavior of our encoding algorithm to this type 
of attack. This is particularly intriguing as it clearly 
reveals a special feature of the watermarking 
method: Since the bit-encoding convention relies on 
altering the actual distribution of the data, it 
survives gracefully to any distribution-preserving 
transformation. Randomly changing the data, while 
it can definitely damage the watermark (e.g., 
especially when altering around 50 percent of the 
data), proves to be, to a certain extent, distribution-
preserving. A zero-average epsilon-attack is 
survived very well. For example, altering 80 
percent of the input data within 20 percent of the 
original values still yields over 70 percent of the 
watermark. 
 
Note: One could argue that, after all, if the 
watermark encoding relies too much on the 
distribution of the data, one successful attack could 
be the one that alters exactly this distribution. But, 
this is not possible, as the power of the 
watermarking scheme lies not only in the 
distribution itself but also in the secrecy of the 
encoding subsets. In other words, where the bits are 
encoded (i.e., subsets) as important as how. 
Altering global data characteristics would not only 
destroy probably much of the value of the data but, 
as shown above, achieve little in destroying the 
watermark. 
 
As the percentage of tuples altered and the 
alteration factor goes up, so does the watermark 
distortion. Nevertheless, it turns out to be 
surprisingly resilient. For example, altering 100 
percent of the data within 1 percent of the original 
values can yield a distortion as low as 5-6 percent 
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in the resulting watermark. The watermark 
distortion increases with increasing (b) alteration 
factor or (c) percentage of data presents a 
comparison between the curves corresponding to 
the alteration of 40 percent of the tuples versus 80 
percent of the tuples. Naturally, the curve for the 
higher tuples percentage appears ―above.‖ A 
comparison is made between curves for the 
alteration factor 1 or 5 percent. The higher 
alteration curve is intuitively ―above.‖ Note that the 
curves are slightly increasing but not very steep: 
Mark alteration is less dependent on the percentage 
of data altered than on the alteration factor. Thus, 
the watermarking scheme proves a natural resilience 
to uninformed attacks (modeled by epsilon-attack 
transformations). 
 
Data Quality (Goodness) Metrics 
 
Here, we analyze the impact of data goodness 
preservation on the available watermark encoding 
bandwidth. Intuitively, the more restrictive data 
constraints one imposes, the less available 
bandwidth there is, as allowable data changes are 
directly impacted.  
In the following, we present two results. The first 
analyzed goodness metric is a commonly 
considered one, namely, upper bounds imposed on 
the total and local tolerable absolute change (i.e., of 
the new data with respect to the original). 
 
Note: An identical experimental result was obtained 
for a related metric, the maximum allowable mean 
squared error.  
 
As data goodness metrics are increasingly 
restrictive, the available bandwidth (guaranteeing 
higher resilience) decreases. In the illustrated 
experiment, the allowed absolute change in the 
watermarked data (i.e., from the original) is 
decreased gradually (from 0.1 to 0.02 percent) and 
the decrease in available encoding bandwidth is 
observed (depicted as a percent of total potential 
bandwidth). The upper limit (approximately 90 
percent) is inherently data imposed and cannot be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
a. defining a new suitable mark encoding 
method marking, S. Katzenbeisser and F. 
Petitcolas, eds. nd  
b. building an algorithmic secure mapping 
(i.e., mark amplification) from a simple 
encoding method to a more complex 
watermarking algorithm, and  
 
applied the concept to numeric relational databases.  
 
We thus provided a solution for resiliently 
watermarking relational databases. We also 
developed a proof of concept implementation of our 
algorithms under the form of a Java software 
package, wmdb.* which we then used to water-
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mark a commercial database, extensively used for 
data-mining in the area of customer trends and 
buying patterns. In upcoming research, we are 
investigating new, nonnumeric encoding domains. 
Furthermore, a model of attacks in this new domain 
needs to be devised and a more detailed attack 
analysis performed. A full-fledged commercial 
watermarking application could be derived from our 
proof-of-concept software. 
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